No, I don't have the original case. This is my first foray into searching case law and it is a long and tedious process. Sorry!
Well, here is the thing.
In the citing case, the aspect of administration and his position of authority was mentioned, but it wasn't pertinent to the subject being formed (Which was, that it's POSSIBLE to be awake, and speaking, and not be able to consent.)
For instance, the evidence in People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590 was that the defendant,a medical doctor, had administered injections to the victim on several occasions; ?that after receiving the shots, the victim felt "?'light-headed'?" and "?'just didn't care about anything'?" (id., p. 607, 55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590); ?that the doctor would then have intercourse with her; ?and that she would not have engaged in intercourse with him had she not been under the influence of the drugs (ibid.). There was apparently no evidence that the victim was unable to speak or otherwise communicate a refusal to consent; ?indeed, the evidence suggested that the victim actually consented to intercourse. Nevertheless, the court summarily rejected the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his rape convictions. (Id., p. 612, 55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590.)
The judge here is setting up the opinion that being able to speak, and having the
ability to resit, doesn't
itselfconstitute capacity
to actually resist. But that's ALL this references, that someone can be coherent, and still be raped--but, the important thing here is the
extenuating circumstances that made that decision possible. In the opinion, the
judge doesn't go into that, he merely says it IS possible. We'd need to look at the original case to see if him being a doctor, and the administration, played a part in their decision.
At least, from what I can tell of this. I'll need to read more about the Giardino case, but essentially, I believe, this is only saying that just because someone
CANgive consent, doesn't preclude it from rape. But that's leaving an
awfullot of extenuating circumstances flying around, Tan. I'm pretty sure everyone would classify a cop blackmailing a woman as rape, even if she "consented" to the sex, for example. In that original case, the doctor being a medical expert, and in a position of authority, in addition to him administering the drug, might have been factors in the courts instructions, if that's the case, this case file doesn't prove much about the subject at hand (I don't know though, I'd like to read it.)
Remember, the core of the argument here (And I've mainly just been just watching, I did make one post about "legal consent" during contracts, because I do a lot of them over drinks, but all in all I'm not here jockeying for a side) is that if a woman drinks, and then consents, it's not rape. The extenuating circumstance of being drugged by someone else, who is in a position of authority (A doctor), RADICALLY changes the circumstance of that argument. Also, In ALL of this Judge's examples,
the people drugged, were drugged BY SOMEONE ELSE. None of these drugs were ingested voluntarily. The judge in the Giardino case you linked, doesn't touch on the extenuating circumstances that made these rapes, he is simply producing a baseline and saying "there have been cases where women can consent, and it's still rape." But--we all know that, Tan. As I said above, if a cop says "you're going to jail for life unless you suck me off"--I'm going to go ahead and call that rape, even if she said yes and didn't resist.
Edit: (Just copying the parts of the opinions showing administration of the drugs was not self inflicted.)
evidence in People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590 was that the defendant, a medical doctor, had administered injections to the victim on several occasions;
In another case against a medical doctor, the victim testified that she went to the defendant for treatment of a suspected illness. (People v. Wojahn (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 135, 139, 337 P.2d 192.) He had her disrobe and gave her a shot and a capsule to swallow. (Ibid.)
Similarly, after ingesting an unspecified drug in a glass of wine at a restaurant, the victim in People v. Crosby (1911) 17 Cal.App. 518, 120 P. 441 walked with the defendant several blocks and up a flight of stairs to a rooming house, waited while the defendant registered for a room, and climbed another flight of stairs with the defendant and the landlord. (Id., p. 521, 120 P. 441.) (Not sure if she voluntarily ingested or not, will have to look it up).
