E. Section 215 and the Bulk Collection of Telephony Meta-data
1. The Program
One reading of section 215 is that the phrase "reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation" means that the order must specify with reasonable particularity the records or other things that must be turned over to the government. For example, the order might specify that a credit card company must turn over the credit records of a particular individual who is reasonably suspected of planning or participating in terrorist activities, or that a telephone company must turn over to the government the call records of any person who called an individual suspected of carrying out a terrorist act within a reasonable period of time preceding the terrorist act.This interpretation of "relevant" would be consistent with the traditional understanding of "relevance" in the subpoena context. In May 2006, however, the FISC adopted a much broader understanding of the word "relevant."84 It was that decision that led to the collection of bulk telephony meta-data under section 215. In that decision, and in thirty-five decisions since, fifteen different FISC judges have issued orders under section 215 directing specified United States telecommunications providers to turn over to the FBI and NSA, "on an ongoing daily basis," for a period of approximately 90 days, "all call detail records or 'telephony meta-data' created by [the provider] for
communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls."85 The "telephony meta-data" that must be produced includes "comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call."86 The orders expressly provide that the meta-data to be produced "does not include the substantive content of any communication . . . or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer," nor does it include "cell site location information."87 The orders also contain a nondisclosure provision directing that, with certain exceptions, "no person shall disclose to any other person that the FBI or NSA has sought or obtained tangible things under this Order."88
The FISC authorized the collection of bulk telephony meta-data under section 215 in reliance "on the assertion of the [NSA] that having access to all the call records 'is vital to NSA's counterterrorism intelligence'
because 'the only effective means by which NSA analysts are able continuously to keep track of'" the activities, operatives, and plans of specific foreign terrorist organizations who "disguise and obscure their
communications and identities" is "'to obtain and maintain an archive of meta-data that will permit these tactics to be uncovered.'"89 The government has explained the rationale of the program as follows:
One of the greatest challenges the United States faces in
combating international terrorism and preventing potentially
catastrophic terrorist attacks on our country is identifying
terrorist operatives and networks, particularly those operating
within the United States. Detecting threats by exploiting
terrorist communications has been, and continues to be, one of
the critical tools in this effort. It is imperative that we have the
capability to rapidly identify any terrorist threat inside the
United States. . . .
. . . By analyzing telephony meta-data based on telephone
numbers or other identifiers associated with terrorist activity,
trained expert analysts can work to determine whether known
or suspected terrorists have been in contact with individuals in
the United States. . . . In this respect, the program helps to close
critical intelligence gaps that were highlighted by the
September 11, 2001 attacks